During last years numerous studies have focused attention on determinants of leverage buyouts (LBOs), finding strong evidence about the capability of those operations to improve firms' productivity and operating performance. Nonetheless, there is a lack of research concerning the performance realized by secondary buyouts (SBOs), which are operations where a LBO is refinanced with a new ownership structure that includes a new set of private equity financiers and a new debt structure. By the analysis of a initial dataset of 164 transactions occurred in Italy during the period from 2000 to 2008, we find evidence of SBOs' rationales of corporate governance, with significant firms' performance improvements.
Introduction
Financial research literature has increasingly focused attention on leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and has found extensive evidence that the transactions improve productivity and operating performance (Jensen, 1993 ; Thompson and Wright, 1995; Cumming, Siegel, Wright, 2007) . As Cumming, Siegel and Wright (2007) noted, little research examined the value increases of buyout targets and returns realized from secondary buyouts (SBOs). These are particularly interesting transactions affecting corporate control due to the involvement of private equity investors as both buyers and sellers. (For this reason, they are also called sponsor-to-sponsor transactions.) Typically, an SBO is an LBO of a company that has previously undergone an LBO; for purposes of this research, SBOs also include all tertiary and successive buyouts.
Our aim is to analyze SBOs, which have been made possible in recent years due to favorable conditions such as available liquidity in debt markets and a significant increase in private equity investors seeking control of corporations. SBOs are a recent phenomenon; consequently, there is little empirical research and literature on the topic. This study aims to determine whether SBOs are simply speculative transactions or flow from more substantive rationales of corporate governance.
LBOs and Secondary Leveraged
Buyouts: the Influence on Firms' Corporate Governance
By analyzing the SBOs that occurred in the Italian market from 2000 to 2008, this research presents evidence regarding the nature of such deals. We study data from SBOs transacted in Italy because the geographical criteria has been retained more appropriate to shortlist a dataset of transactions (Volpin, 2002; Melis, 2000) . This paper makes three original contributions. First, it gathers the available literature regarding SBOs, which is very fragmented implementing it with an evidence from these particular deals. Second, the research is based on a detailed dataset (a set of 164 Italian buyouts from the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , generated from accurate research of the Italian market for corporate control. The dataset is unique and original because private equity in Italy generally has limited information disclosure due to legal, fiscal and privacy restrictions. Third, this paper is the first empirical work focused entirely on SBOs that includes both the buy side and the sell side. It examines whether SBOs are just speculative ventures for investors or transactions that can lead to value increases and gains in productivity and operating performance for the subject companies. Recent studies of LBOs based on shareholder returns data ; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989 ; Marais et al., 1989 ) and company returns (Smith 1990 ; Smart and Waldfogel, 1994; Wright at al., 1996) In an SBO, an initial LBO is refinanced with a new ownership structure that includes a new set of private equity financiers and a new debt structure. In general, an LBO allows investors to buy a company with minimal equity commitment but with significant debt which the bought-out company assumes. The company must improve performance simply to service its increased debt obligations (Burriugh, 1990; Cumming, Fleming, Schwienbacher, 2006; Cuny, Talmor, 2007) . According to most relevant literature (Jensen, 1986; , LBOs generally result in improved corporate governance mechanisms (such as operating efficiency, governance of debt structure, strongest ownership of equity and the presence of active investors) that reduce agency costs and increase firm value (Bierman, 2003; Cumming, 2006; Bernile, Cumming, Lyandres, 2007) . Nonetheless, the burden of additional principal and interest payments limits how much management can improve a company's operating efficiency and increase its profits.
An SBO then effects its own changes to the company, which prompts questions about how such transactions affect company performance. Tied to these questions is the issue of whether SBOs are merely speculative and, consequently, whether investors are just assuming the risk of loss in return for an uncertain prospect of reward (Renneboog, Simons, Wright, 2007) . To resolve this we need to determine whether private equity firms have precise plans for target companies and whether they are able to implement them.
Private equity activity is based on buying a company's equity with the goal of increasing share value while addressing two problems of the company: no price signaling from the market and no liquidity support are resolved because private equity operates outside stock exchanges (Gompers, Lerner, 1999; Kaplan, Schoar, 2005; Jensen et al., 2006) . After a period of "hands-on" management, the investor hopes to demonstrate to the market an increase in the company's value and so will be able to sell the equity participation at an increased price. This should mean that the longer a private equity fund holds a company, the greater will be the value added (the more intensive the work, at least). In the event of selling shares through a subsequent SBO, this should translate into higher stock prices. Therefore, we hypothesize:
We expect a positive correlation between transaction multiples of the SBO and holding period of the exiting fund.
From the buyer's perspective, the price paid in an SBO transaction represents a baseline; he must be sure that when subsequently selling the shares he will receive at least that value plus the required rate of return ("hurdle rate"). If the holding period of the exiting fund was long, then we can assume that the fund had more time to catch any "low hanging fruit" (easily accomplished tasks that improve performance and create value) and that, consequently, fewer such opportunities remain. Accordingly, we can assume that the longer a company has been held in the portfolio of the exiting investor, buyers in an SBO would pay a lower price in order to allow for sufficient margins for future capital gains. The buyer's motivations act in the opposite direction from the seller's. If unchecked, they would lead to opposite results. Therefore, we hypothesize:
We expect a negative correlation between transaction multiples and holding period of the exiting fund.
We assume that a potential SBO investor, based on its due-diligence and expertise, is able to estimate by how much its possible future decisions will increase a company's value. To analyze whether SBOs are speculative transactions or deals based on specific rationales, it is relevant to determine whether there is a preexisting awareness of the private equity investing in an SBO regarding the target company (Diamond, 1985; Crawford, 1987; Cotter, Peck, 2001; Cuny, Talmor, 2007) .
We will try to analyze whether the price paid is related to the investor's preexisting awareness of the company's potential for increased value. Investors who believe that they could not implement performance improvements would be willing to pay only reduced prices, while investors who believe that they could add value would be willing to pay higher prices. Therefore, we hypothesize: [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] ; all transactions whose "deal origination" was designated as "SBO" and whose "exit strategy" was designated as "releverage" were included in the final dataset. In addition, all transactions listed in Merger Market (Private Equity Exits tool) with an exit strategy of "SBO" were included in the final dataset. The table in Figure 1 summarizes the results.
Fig. 1 Results of the research of SBOs through financial media
The analysis is conducted without regard to actual debt-to-equity (D/E) ratios. Thus, no threshold level was set for a transaction to be designated as an SBO, and deals in the dataset may have very different amounts of leverage. In order to be included in the dataset, the deals only had to meet the criteria set by the prominent financial media listed above (Private Equity Monitor Yearly Newsletter and Merger Market).
The 164 observations were merged into the final dataset, with the following details and statistics listed for each operation:
• Year: the year in which the transaction was closed; • Sector: the main industry sector in which the target company operates; • Lead Investor: the name of the private equity fund sponsoring the transaction and the one with the majority stake in the transaction; in the transaction, that is, the sum of equity invested and debt borrowed.
• Leverage ratio: the leverage ratio of the purchasers of the target company. It is calculated as total debt of the purchasers divided by total equity of the newly constituted company 2 ;
• Seller: the seller of the target company;
• Holding period of exiting investor (in months): the number of months between the closing of the first LBO and the closing of the SBO (when known); if the exact month of either transaction is unknown, a statistic was built as the year of the SBO minus the year of the former LBO times 12. The author used the following informationproviders to fill any information gaps:
• in the transaction, that is, the sum of equity invested and debt borrowed; • Seller: the seller of the target company to the first private equity fund. After eliminating any duplicates and transactions for which available data were insufficient for analysis, the final dataset resulted in 88 operations and 72 companies. (The difference is because 14 companies underwent SBOs two or three times, 3 and they appear in the dataset for each instance.)
The following companies were excluded from the dataset due to insufficient data about their deals:
• Aive
Research method rationale
With the database completed, we tested for any increase of target company value, using the marginal increase of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) as the main indicator of company value increase (Muscarella, Vetsuypens, 1990; Desbrierers, Schatt, 2002) . If a company increases its operating margin it will also increase its cash flow, which will cause the company to gain a higher valuation (Andrade, Kaplan, 1998 To determine if an SBO investor actually added value to a target company, the following two steps were executed. First, we established a company's average rate of competitiveness before the SBO transaction. This will serve as a baseline in the analysis of company performances after the deal. The company competitive advantage/disadvantage before the SBO was found by computing the average yearly competitive performance advantage for the five years before the SBO. Second, to test if the SBO purchaser actually made a company more profitable and added value to it, the competitive advantage/disadvantage before the SBO was subtracted from the yearly competitive performance advantage of each year following the SBO.
There is a common element in an SBO transaction that links the entering investors and the exiting investors but nonetheless assumes a different significance for each: the price paid for company's shares. For the sellers (exiting fund), the deal amount recognizes any value they added to the company and will determinate their final returns on that transaction, especially Internal Rate of Return and the Money Multiple (Palepu, 1990; Loh, 1992; Renneboog, Simons, Wright, 2007) . For the buyers (entering fund), the price paid represents the bar that they must surpass in creating company value. To carry out our analysis, and especially to compare the different deals, the price paid in each transaction had to be standardized. The most efficient way to standardize deal prices is to compute transaction multiples. The enterprise value (EV) was computed for each deal; company EBITDA and sales were then used to compute the ratios, EV/EBITDA and EV/SALES. In building the dataset, great effort was made to find each SBO's "mother" LBO. In order to understand the motivations behind the SBO, it is helpful to have a complete history of the target company, and especially the particulars of the original LBO.
The average value of the originating LBOs, expressed as the sum of debt and equity involved, was €220 million, and the average percentage of shares acquired was 72 percent. In 47 observations, the LBO was conducted through an investors' buyout (IBO), which means that private equity investors were the main sponsors of the original LBO. In 15 deals, a management team supported the transaction and invested in it (MBO). Very important to our analysis, 15 transactions originated from previous SBOs (meaning that they were tertiary or quaternary buyouts). Six buyouts were sponsored by teams external to the company (MBI), and two were publicto-private transactions, which counts a lot in terms of volumes due to the nature of the de-listing operation. There was one case each of a corporate buyout (CBO) and a family buyout (FBO).
Fig. 4 SBO-originating deals, by type
It is also crucial to identify the year of the first LBO in order to determine whether SBOs are a cyclical phenomenon in the market for corporate control. It may be shown that SBOs are a natural consequence of previous high-volume activity by private equity investors, not finding on the market, when willing to exit from portfolio companies, enough cash availability from strategic player or from capital markets. This would be indicated if the deals originating the SBO were concentrated around a specific time, for example during two of our target years.
As far as the Italian market for corporate control is concerned, this theory is refuted. The distribution of LBOs that generated SBOs is fairly flat during the years 1997 to 2006, creating a constant pipeline for SBOs (Fig. 5) . So far, only two deals in 2006 have originated SBOs, but this is not significant because it was so recent; over time, this number will probably increase. Holding periods of Italian LBO companies are fairly equally distributed. There are 29 companies that were held for 24 months or less, and 54 companies were held longer. Moreover, 18 companies of the sample were held in portfolio for more than four years (Fig. 6 ).
Fig. 6 Holding periods of LBO selling investors
The greatest number of companies (30) that are taken over through SBOs belong to the manufacturing and industrial sector, 12 companies are in the chemical industry, and seven are in business and financial support services (Fig. 7) . Such industries are fairly noncyclical, and the literature indicates that they are the same sectors that are most suitable for LBOs (Kaplan, Strömberg, 2008) .
It is impressive that seven LBOs were of companies belonging to the luxury and fashion industry, which is typically a very cyclical industry; this is not consistent with the recognized criteria for ideal LBO candidates. It is also noteworthy that in the energy industry (electricity and gas) only one transaction lead to an SBO. Usually companies in this sector have stable and predictable cash flows, making them good candidates for LBOs (Jensen, 1986; Strömberg, 2008) . The probable explanation is that until recently the State owned the energy industry, and so few big players have emerged. For the 87 SBOs observed in the Italian market for corporate control between 2000 and 2008, the average deal size was €271 million, with an even distribution of number of deals among medium and big size (over €50 million). 4 The most populous category is small deals (under €50 million), with 25 transactions (Fig.  8 ). There are three likely explanations for the prevalence of so many small deals. First, little capital was employed because very few shares were acquired in each company. Second, target companies had low valuation multiples, and so little capital was employed in acquiring them. And third, companies that were targets of SBOs were simply small in size. On average, the shares acquired were equivalent to 85 percent of each company, and in almost 60 percent of transactions all of the target company's stock was acquired; thus, the first hypothesis can be discarded. Analysis also showed that very few companies in the dataset had low valuation multiples; thus, the second hypothesis is eliminated. Consequently, the main reason for so many small deals is simply the small size of target companies. This looks even likelier if we consider the texture of Italian industry, which is characterized by many small-to-medium sized enterprises.
Ironically, SBOs impose particular difficulties for small firms. They are typically highly leveraged transactions, and end up saddling target companies with large amounts of debt (Weir, Jones, Wright, 2008) . The burden of paying down such debt is especially unwieldy for small companies. Such increased debt burdens pose less of a risk to larger firms, which can diversify more and are less exposed to economic cycles. Consequently, one would think that it would be wiser for SBOs to target bigger firms and avoid smaller ones.
In terms of money volume, SBO 5 activity peaked in 2006 (Fig. 9 ). The downward trend since then seems to continue, as volumes for the first half of 2008 are less than a third of 2007 volumes. This is most likely due to the ongoing liquidity crisis in capital markets. If mega deals (more than €500 million) are removed from consideration, the trend is positive until 2007, with a drastic downward swoop in 2008. In addition, volumes are cut in half in every year; this shows that mega deals, though few in number, play a huge role in the Italian market. Especially noteworthy is the amount of 2008 volume that is due to mega deals, more than 90 percent. This is probably due to the current liquidity crisis. In terms of number of transactions, a more even distribution is observed among yearly figures (Fig. 10) . Nonetheless, amounts increase from year 2000, peak in 2005, and decrease in 2006 and 2007. The first semester of 2008 registered six SBOs, almost the half the amount (13) for all of 2007. Differences in term of mega deals per year are not significant; big deals are not concentrated in any certain period, and they occur every year so they are not to be considered extraordinary.
We analyzed the valuations of target companies, using valuations given by the buying fund, or if available, the valuation that resulted from the negotiations. 7 The purpose of the analysis was to define a metric for the valuation of companies undergoing an SBO; in the process, we considered multiples achieved in each deal. As enterprise values, we used the deal amount multiplied by the percentage of shares acquired. We then divided these figure by EBITDA and Sales, respectively, from the income statement of the SBO year to calculate two multiples for each company. These multiples were immediately available from the dataset already built and are the ones most commonly relied on by professionals of private equity firms (Bierman, Transaction multiples concentrate around "normal" values for EV/EBITDA and EV/SALES. A consistent number of deals reach very high multiple values and consequently assign very high values to the acquired companies. Specifically, nine deals were valued with EV/EBITDA ratios greater than 21 (Fig. 11) , and 11 deals were valued with EV/SALES greater than three (Fig. 12) . It would be interesting for a future study to analyze whether these companies had some common features before the SBO, and whether they were the best achievers in their sectors or had the greatest performance improvement. In order to gain perspective on the development of each of the 72 companies, and to measure their operating efficiency and profitability, EBITDA margins were tabulated for years 1996 to 2006. The EBITDA margin is computed as . For statistical purposes, after tabulating results for "relative years" (1996 to 2006), the EBITDA margin was tabulated for "absolute years" (Year 0 is set at the time of the SBO, Time 1 (-1) at one year after (before) the SBO, and Time 2 (-2) at two years after (before) the SBO, and so on.
To collect these data, we mainly used Bureau Van Dijk's electronically published Aida, a prominent database, to locate balance sheets. LBOs are often conducted through special purpose vehicles, and a target company may change its fiscal code and business name after the acquisition. This caused difficulties in locating some balance sheets because Aida did not have complete sets for all of them. To fill gaps, we referred to scanned-copies obtained directly by Bureau Van Dijk and, when available, to balance sheets downloaded from companies' web sites.
In order to have benchmarks, EBITDA margins of companies comparable to the ones in our dataset were collected, and results were tabulated for "relative years" and "absolute years." In order to conduct an unbiased comparison of the EBITDA margin for each company, it was necessary to find comparable companies operating in the same industry, and especially companies that were also similar in size. To achieve greater accuracy and realism, we built a customized set of comparables rather than rely on generalized benchmark sector indicators. This was especially helpful because of the great range of size of our dataset companies. (Sales of the smallest firm were only €2 million, while sales of the biggest firm were more than €1.5 billion.)
In order to find comparable companies, we searched Aida for firms with the same ATECO 2002 code 9 and with similar sales amounts, plus or minus 40 percent, of a target company's sales during the last four years available (2006, 2005, 2004, 2003) . We tried to find on average 20 comparables for each target company, with a maximum of 30 and a minimum of 10. When not enough comparables were available because the target company's sales were too big or it operated in a niche business, the ten closest companies in term of sales within the same ATECO 2002 code were selected as comparables.
In some cases, a company's listed ATECO 2002 code referred to the activity of "financial intermediation" or "holding companies," reflecting the original purpose of the company created as a shell for purposes of the acquisition. In such cases, we found an appropriate ATECO 2002 code that mirrored the company's real industrial activity. The results show that the yearly competitive performance advantage average of the dataset is positive by at least 3.6 percent and peaks at 9.0 percent the year before the SBO. Years 5 and 6 are not so significant because very few companies underwent SBOs so long ago, but the figures are nonetheless impressive and noteworthy. In the following table, negative numerals designate the number of years before the SBO and positive numerals designate the number of years after the SBO (absolute years).
We can then state that, on average, SBOs are conducted on high performing companies. This finding aligns with and provides empirical evidence for comparable statements in the LBO literature regarding LBOs cited in Section 3.2. It also confirms the hypothesis that SBOs are deals with a specific rationale or that at least, when picking SBO targets, investors look at these characteristic and conduct detailed screening (Fig. 15) . The quartile analysis (Fig. 16) gives a clearer picture of the relative performance distribution of the companies. We set out to analyze differences between SBO operations. Accordingly, we established criteria to classify SBOs as speculative, coerced or pure. There is great agreement among the literature on LBOs and SBOs that a target company must be among the best performers in its sector (Cumming, Siegel, Wright, 2007) . For our purposes, target companies that are in the first quartile (worst performers) of their respective industries ex ante are deemed to be targets of speculative SBOs.
Companies that perform in the second quartile of their industries do not manifest clear advantages vis-à-vis their sector comparables. Looked at three years before the SBO, such companies perform only 0.12 percent better than their sector (Fig. 15) ; any marginal advantage is insignificant. And focusing on the time one year before an SBO, this quartile reaches a top comparative advantage of 7.5 percent; this is an improvement, but is hardly impressive when compared with the concurrent figures posted by the better performing half of the industry (15.25 percent for the third quartile and 38.67 percent for the fourth quartile). Accordingly, target companies from second quartiles are classified as coerced SBOs.
Companies in the third and fourth quartiles have clear marginal advantages over their comparables. Accordingly, such target companies are classified as pure SBO. Focusing on the time three years before an SBO, the comparative advantage of these companies range up to almost 43 percent. And at least 50 percent of SBOs on the Italian market for corporate control are pure SBOs, and so are not based on speculative or coercive approaches.
Companies' performances after the SBO
In order to determine whether an investor that takes over a target company through an SBO actually adds value to the company, the following two steps were executed. First, the competitive advantage/disadvantage gained by the target company before the SBO was calculated. This measure was computed as an average of yearly competitive performance advantage of the five years before the SBO. This process aimed to establish the target company's average grade of competitiveness reached before the SBO transaction. It will be used as the baseline for analyzing company performance after the deal.
To test whether the SBO investors actually enhanced profitability and added value to the target company, the competitive advantage/disadvantage gained by the company before the SBO was subtracted from the yearly competitive performance advantage of each year following the SBO.
The calculation was conducted for the fiscal year of the SBO and three subsequent years (Fig. 16) . (Few companies in our dataset have a history of more than three years post-SBO.) 
Empirical analysis and results
To compare different deals, the price paid in each transaction was standardized by computing the transaction multiples. We computed EV as the deal amount multiplied by the percentage of shares acquires. We then used company EBITDA and sales to compute the ratios, EV/EBITDA and EV/SALES. We tested hypotheses HP 1 and HP 2 by conducting respective regressions of EV/EBITDA and EV/SALES against the buying group's holding period. Figures 17 and 18 show the dispersion charts and regression results. Fig. 18) show that neither hypothesis is confirmed with an R squared coefficient of determination close to zero and a high P-value in both regressions. Possibly, one hypothesis or the other applies, depending on the particulars of a case. Or it could be that price is a result of the complex negotiation process between sellers and buyers, and is influenced only slightly by the amount of time the seller has held the company in portfolio.
We test whether the price an investor pays for a company relates to his pre-deal awareness of his potential to increase the company's value (Hypothesis HP 3). In order to verify this hypothesis, we conducted respective regressions between the entry EV/EBITDA multiples and EV/SALES multiples and the EBITDA margin reached one year after SBO and the average EBITDA margin reached two years after SBO. Figures 19-22 show the dispersion charts and regression results. The two regressions based on the EV/Sales multiple show that the transaction multiples based on Sales are positively related to the company's performance improvement after the SBO. The Rsquared value in the regression of the first-year results is 41.9 percent, and the R-squared value in the regression of the second-year is 27.6 percent. P-value in both regressions is very low making them significant. Accordingly, we can state that EV/Sales is a good proxy for performance improvement implemented by the buying fund.
Thus, there is a positive correlation between the price paid, in terms of the entry multiple EV/SALES, and the performance improvement put in place after the SBO. These results are probably due to the investors' awareness before investing of how much they could improve the target company's performance. Investors are willing to pay more if they perceive that the performance improvement will be greater.
This implies that SBO sponsors have an ex ante awareness of the possibility of increasing the target company's value. This is exactly the opposite of what a speculative investment is, since the definition of speculation is the assumption of the risk of loss, in return for the uncertain possibility of reward. In this case, the awareness of reward, in terms of performance improvement, is known.
Conclusions
Our analysis shows that SBOs are not a cyclical phenomenon. Thus, they are not caused only by excess liquidity in the financial system. Consequently, it should not be assumed that they are conducted because there are few other deals to pursue. Even if the flow of private equity deals is sizeable, and even if target companies originate through means other than a previous LBO, SBOs will remain relevant in the market. A better theory based on our evidence would be that private equity is a business with a limited time horizon and that SBOs compensate for this lack of time.
If SBOs help improve performance, then it is proved that operating under (heavy) leverage may create incentives for top management and workers alike to achieve better results because of greater commitment to their jobs. Strategically, the effect could be to limit or even eliminate investments with negative present values or are part of the company's core business.
The price paid in a SBO transaction, expressed in term of entry multiple EV/SALES or EV/EBITDA, is not based on the holding period of the exiting investor. This implies that there is no acknowledgement of the work done inside the company by the exiting investor.
An SBO implemented on a company with an EBITDA margin lower than its industry sector average does not comply with the usual criteria of target selection posited by many authors who have researched LBOs. Thus, such an SBO can be considered speculative. Based on EBITDA margin differentials of industry comparables, most Italian transactions can be classified as pure SBOs. Accordingly, most SBOs in Italy are not speculative in nature.
The most meaningful result of this work is that it has identified a positive correlation between the price paid for SBOs, in terms of the entry multiple EV/SALES, and the performance improvement put in place after the SBO. This means that an SBO's sponsors have an ex ante awareness about the possibility of increasing the target company's value; and the greater the perceived future value increase, the more they are willing to pay. Their awareness of reward, in terms of performance improvement, is known. This is the opposite of a speculative investment, which is defined as the assumption of the risk of loss in return for the uncertain possibility of reward.
This whole study was conducted without regard to actual D/E ratios of the dataset's transactions. Deals were picked based on information given by financial media we referred to, and capital structures were undisclosed. A possible limit of this study is its lack of an analysis based on capital structure and its influences on the factors tested. Similarly, we did not analyze variables such as debt availability and credit spreads at the time of the transaction, though they may have influenced the decision to undertake an SBO.
This study was conducted on the Italian market for corporate control which, as previously explained, is not as big and developed as in other countries; hence, it could be not fully representative of SBOs transactions. Value creation was measured in terms of EBITDA margins; this is an appropriate measure, but may not give a full picture of a company's profitability or value. This opens the possibility for further research that investigates even "soft" drivers of value creation (e.g., the relationship of the buying fund's management team with the banking system in terms of credit spreads, the company's existing relationship with suppliers, etc.).
SBOs and private equity investments are phenomena less than a decade old in Italy. Consequently, it would have been meaningless to try to analyze the life of a company after an SBO. Such research should wait at least seven years. Points to analyze might include to whom a company is sold after an SBO and whether a capital gain is obtained. Future researchers might consider the present work as a starting point.
